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There is good agreement am:mg the people 
of various ti.rres and cultures concerning the 
basic elements present in the world. In 
nature there are celestial J:xxlies and rrove-
ments, weather, plants and animals, and the 
land and water of the earth's surface. In 
htmliID affairs there are families, problems of 
food and reproduction, social and political 
structures, and experiences of unseen reali-
ties of an errotional, spiritual, or religious 
sort. There are males and females, strong 
and weak individuals, birth, sickness, and 
death, as well as love, joy, and pleasure. 
Cultural m::xlels agree well in their inven-
tories of the world's significant canp:>nents, 
but they vary greatly in their assessrrent of 
the relationships arrong these components. 
Every culture finds its awn m::xlel of organi-
zation for them. 
A favorite m::xlel of organization within 
Western culture has been the hierarchical 
scheme which arranges all elements of reality 
according to a vertical scale of sane sort. 
Anyone who has suffered education in our 
culture ]mCMS that every part of the standard 
curriculum is infonned by hierarchical cri-
teria, both as the objects of study and as 
the methods for sttrlying. The influences of 
this persistent m::xlel of reality are all 
around us: in philosofX1ical systems, litera-
ry forms, social institutions, political 
structures, educational organizations, scien-
tific systems of classification, and in the 
laws and custans governing human behavior. 
Wherever the Chain of Being has been 
applied, it has been asst.nned that value in-
creases at each higher notch upon the scale. 
"IDwer" forms of existence are always less 
important than "higher" forms. Further, the 
status of every element upon the vertical 
scale defines the rights that it enjoys. God 
possesses all rights, while stones have none 
at all. Those of us who are neither gods nor 
rocks llU1st be oontent with an intennediate 
status and limited rights, with sane things 
possible for us and others impossible. All 
animals, incltrling humans, are such middle 
creatures. 
We have ccrne to accept the notion that 
there are lower forms of life and higher 
forms. Even biologists testify to the vali-
dity of the chain and use its terminology in 
their laboratories and professional writings. 
The fX1ylogenetic scale canes out of Plato and 
Aristotle by way of Linnaeus, and it is nice-
ly consistent with other versions of the 
Chain of Being. Scientists who would never 
think of experimenting upon htmliID beings at 
the upper end of the scale are perfectly 
oontent to carve, drug, torture, oonfine, and 
redesign animals lCMer on the scale because 
their status allCM5 them no rroral rights to 
life, liberty, or to the pursuit of their own 
destinies. 
I do not mean to suggest that hierarchi-
cal m::xlels are solely the invention of Wes-
tern culture, although it does seem that the 
West has institutionalized and internalized 
such m::xlels rrore thoroughly than other peo-
pies. The Confucian tradition of China, for 
instance, is a thorough-going hierarchical 
m::xlel of social order based upon status roles 
in the htmliID family and extended to political 
and ethical structures. Hindu social order 
is also rigidly and notoriously hierarchical. 
Even the Hopi Indians have a kind of inverted 
scale which places highest value upon those 
things closest to the earth, which is why the 
Hopi worship in underground kivas with the 
spiritual leader situated at a lCMer eleva-
tion than his atrlience. And, as has been 
learned only recently, many animals are so-
cially organized acoording to status roles 
oonferred by birth, behavior, or gender. 
Abundance evidence suggests that hierarchies 
are, in fact, principles of nature and that 
status within them defines an individual's 
rights and responsibilities. 
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Natural hierarchies are nornally fOtUld 
only within given groups of conspecifics. 
'!be rank-order in a IOOngoose colony applies 
only to members of that colony, and it does 
not even affect neighboring colonies of IOOn-
gooses, let alone other species living in the 
same area. Humans alone have imagined that 
they p::>ssess a species status which elevates 
them above other species. We are remarkable 
annng animals because of our attempts to live 
according to an imaginary interspecies dani-
nance hierarchy. other animals, of course, 
do knot know about the relative status they 
have been assigned in our system; so, they 
continue to disa~int us by ignoring our 
rules. 
Confusion is bound to occur when a pat-
tern of dominance developed within one spe-
cies is extended to inclooe all species. One 
of the clearest examples of the problem is 
evident in the relative status of male and 
female human beings, which has long been 
mixed up in our minds with the relative sta-
tus of mankind as a whole and nature as a 
whole. 
Wanen and nature have occupied virtually 
the same status in the traditional structures 
of mythology, pililic imagery, fXti.losofily, and 
law. Whatever may be conceived of as "rights 
of nature" in any given period are likely to 
be consistent, if not identical, with that 
period I S conception of "the rights of wanen." 
It is not merely coincidental that a renewed 
interest in the rights of natural environ-
ments should occur simultaneously with a 
massive social effort to redefine the rights 
and status of wanen. For, as nature is 
thought of by ma.nk.i.nd, so will wanen be 
thought of by men. As humans conceive the 
roles and rights of nature, so will men con-
ceive the roles and rights of waren. 
Neither nature nor wanan is as simple as 
both have been been assurred to be in IOOst 
hierarchical schemes. Nature is not merely a 
garden provided for mankind I S nourishment and 
canfort, but a canplex system with a capacity 
to encourage many fonns of life other than 
human forms. Humans are one species of the 
several million whose intricate relationships 
constitute what we think of as "nature." To 
asSUIre that the system of nature is simpler 
than one of its canponent parts--humanity--
was never reasonable, and it has now becane 
canpletely absurd in the light of the ecolo-
gical knowledge of nature I s cx::mplexity. Si-
milarly, wanan no longer seems the simple 
=eature she has often been thought to be. 
In addition to giving birth, ~sU19 chil-
dren, and keeping house, waren also exper-
ience canplex states of consciousness and are 
fully capable of urrlerstanding and of creat-
ing intellectual, spiritual, and a..-tlstic ex-
periences of a high order. Wanen can be 
quite as responsible before the world as men 
and are no longer likely to be content merely 
to serve the interests of individual men or 
those of a collective of male-dan:inated s0-
ciety. 
Traditional IOOral categories also fail 
to agree with what is now known about nature 
and has always been known about wanen. The 
seductiveness and seductability of Eve are no 
IOOre typical of wanen than are the spiritual-
i ty and ~ity of Mary. Like men, waren are 
capable of both corruption and ccrnpassion and 
of the many gradations of hate and affection, 
deception and honesty, selfishness and al-
truism which make up the IOOral rep::>rtoire of 
humanity. Neither the top nor the bottan of 
a hierarchical IOOral scale is a suitable 
niche for wanan, though she has seldan been 
allowed any other choices. In the same way, 
nature has been jooged to be either fundamen-
tally evil or divinely perfect. Pastoral 
scenes of IOOral perfection are no IOOre accu-
rate about nature than are the grisly scenes 
of brutality imagined by Social Darwinists 
who interpret "survival of the fittest" as if 
it referred to a gigantic Darwinian Donny-
brook. Neither nature nor wanan is inher-
ently evil, nor inherently pure. 
It is also untrue that undeveloped land 
and wanen ImlSt be managed by men in order to 
achiever their full p::>tentials, though our 
laws and custans persist in this assumption. 
Wilderness land supports IOOre life and a-
chieves rrore ecological elegance than farms 
can ever know, and with better prospects for 
stability and future growth. Land manages 
itself better than bureaus of land management 
can. Similarly, shrews--....hether two- or 
four-legged--can fulfill their lives without 
being tam:rl by men, especially if taming has 
no better p.rrpose than to affinn male power. 
Wanen and wilderness have alike been forced 
to sutmit to male management "for their own 
good" but to the loss of their inherent in-
tegrities. 
Power has traditionally grown out of the 
barrel of a penis. Rigid male machines poke 
at the earth pretending to fertilize it, 
heedless of the destruction of delicate tis-
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sues. Possessing nature is the entertainment 
of all-male gangs of engineers, m:mntaineers, 
miners and frontiersmen who leave their wanen 
at hane when they set out, weapons at the 
ready, to ravish ~ther Nature. Ostensibly, 
the girls are left behind to spare them dan­
ger, but the mutual admiration typical of men 
in such gangs is enough to explain why the 
conquest of nature has been ITOstly a mascu­
line sport. Nature is the wanan men ITOunt in 
plblic to display their prowess before one 
another, while wives are screwed at hane to 
affirm male supremacy over females. A screw 
is an engineering device used to hold things 
in place. 
Nature has been assumed to exist only to 
serve humanity's needs, just as woman exists 
to serve man's. Both have been thought of as 
camodities, resources to be mined. Adam 
received daninion over nature and over Eve, 
both gifts of Go::l. From the raw materials of 
nature and wanan, Adam was supposed to fa­
shion heaven using his male tools. So, his 
descendants pla.red the earth, and they plowed 
their wives, for both were properties needing 
improvement before their benefits could be 
realized. As Rene Dubas once put it, "Man 
can manipulate nature to his best interests 
only if he first loves her for her own 
sake" [1] --as if there were no contradiction 
between love and profitable manipulation. 
Exploitation is not the only purpose 
guiding wan's relation to nature and woman, 
for he has also found pleasure and beauty in 
both. Both have been thought of as enriching 
ornaments on the bare bones of life. Both 
offer relief from rronotony and ugliness, 
comfort after struggle, and the titillations 
of sensual pleasure. National parks, like 
beauty queens, are set aside as inviolate 
specimens and fenced from the uses of indivi­
dual men, so that all may ogle them equally. 
Pride is also at work even in such preserva­
tions of pleasure, for parks and queens alike 
serve as status displays proving that those 
who are rich and powerful can afford to main­
tain beautiful and useless objects merely for 
the pleasure they will provide. 
Perhaps the simplest way to surrmarize 
the conventional imagery of woman and natureif 
is merely to repeat a few typical sentences 
in which the feminine pronoun can be indis­
criminately replaced by either word: nature 
or woman. She is corrupt, because she is 
exclusively biological and, thus, incapable 
of spirit or rroral responsibility. She re­
presents physical existence, and metafhysics 
helps to transcend her. Yet her image and 
her environs often inspire men toward Splrl­
tual achievement. She represents fertility 
when she is properly cultivated and death or 
danger when she is permitted to remain wild. 
Taming her is man's task on earth, the ful­
fillment of which affirms his maleness. She 
is a prize to be won by males in battle, and 
she is a source of male repose when the 
battle has been won. She was provided by a 
male god to be man's servant. Her influence 
tempts man to sin and inspires him to his 
salvation. Such mix-and-match metafhors have 
provided western culture with a unified way 
to think about woman and nature and to regu­
late the status and rights of both. A con­
sistent axiom of our culture affirms that 
nature is to mankind as women are to men. 
A revolution has begun which challenges 
the traditional status accorded to women and 
to nature. Both have been canpromised beyond 
their endurance and made to bear unbearable 
burdens. Water and air have accepted enor­
rrous quantities of humanity's poisons, and 
now they have begun to kill us with our own 
contaminants. They do so incidentally and 
without malice; nature is merely announcing 
that it can take no more of our crap. That 
is also rrodern woman's message to men, but 
women speak from a reservoir of anger that is 
unknown to nature. Women are capable of 
revenge as the ecosfhere is not. From both 
sources, the message is increasingly clear: 
the world is not well served by a hierarchy 
that relegates natural processes and females 
to subordinate levels with no rights to pro­
tect them from abuse. 
Of course, Reversing the hierarchy will 
not solve the problem. It would be no im­
provement if nature were to dominate mankind 
or if wanen were to dominate Iren. It is the 
hierarchy itself that seems inadequate, h0w­
ever it my be organized. In its place is 
emerging a recognition that systems unlike 
one's own must enjoy the right to fulfillment 
according to their own inherent needs. Males 
must begin to learn how to recognize and 
respond to the genuine needs of females, just 
as humanity must discover how to honor the 
canplex structures of natural ecology. sta­
tus is no longer appropriate for the determi­
nation of rights, and it never was. 
Natural creatures do not enjoy any sta­
tus beyond that earned arrong the :i.nmedi.ate 
members of their own species. \'blves are not 
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superior to the rabbits they prey uIXXl or to 
the envirooment they live in, fX)r do they 
enjoy any special rights within their sur­
rounding ea::>systems. A wolf's status is 
fixed by cal\PE!tition with the other wolves in 
its clan and is not significant beyond the 
contiguous social group. Effective group 
hunting simply requires leadership and the 
exercise of authority. Fortunately, wolves 
cannot elevate their status structures into 
cosmic hierarchies, as people have done. 
Non-hierarchical systans of classifica­
tion are worth examining. several are a­
vailable to us fran the ancient past and fran 
cultural traditions other than our 0NIl. 
CA1e such system has been pieced together 
fran the remains of Paleolithic art dating 
between 30,000 B.C. and 10,000 B.C. Paleoli­
thic art represents ancient human values and 
patterns of thought before these were nodi­
fied by the powerful forces of agricultural 
civilization and intellectual culture. Pa­
leolithic art .antedates agriculture and the 
dcmestication of animals, and it represents a 
way of life based uIXXl hunting and close 
coordination between human affairs and na­
tural ecology. 
Paleolithic art is primitive only in the 
sense that it is very old. It is not simple, 
nor is it confined to representations of 
Illlmdane activities or observed objects and 
events. Rather, it displays a subtle symbol­
ic node of thought which remained consistent­
ly expressive of human sensibilities for a 
period of sane twenty thousand years. 'lbe 
stability of this artistic tradition rested 
uIXXl a dualistic, non-hierarchical system 
which classified all living creatures accord­
ing to gender in a single symbolic scheme. 
'lbere is no Paleolithic pornograIily 
displaying sexual relations between zren and 
wanen. 'lbe caves are not nonuzrents to sexual 
conquests, nor do they display images of 
sexual fertility and voluptuousness. Aston­
ishingly, "there is not a single scene of 
human copulation in all Paleolithic art, not 
even a single instance of an i thYIilallic 
figure in close proximity to a female fi­
gure."[2] There is, however, a "fundamental 
principle of pairing" • there are male 
and female animal figures whose actions do 
not overtly allooe to sexual reproduction, 
but whose male and female qualities are in­
dispensably cunplementary. " [3] H'lmans are 
artXlllg these male and female symbols, but they 
are by no means daninant. Along with the 
animals, humans take their place in a larger 
sexual classification of all life forms. 
Genital and reproductive aspects of 
sexuality are minor and inconsequential fea­
tures of Paleolithic art. Male and female 
are significant categories of life because of 
the different values and behavior that they 
represent. 'lbey stand for a world that is 
ordered according to alternation, complemen­
tarity, and antagonism between two principles 
which occupy equal halves of a horizontal 
scale. Differential functions, rather than 
differential status, are the significant 
criteria for organization. 
Paleolithic taxonany (unlike that of 
Aristotle or Linnaeus) seems to be based upon 
the proposition that variations in behavior 
and temperazrent are rrnre important principles 
of classification than variation in anatany 
and physiology. In such a system, gender is 
the guiding principle, for there are only two 
large classes of life: male and female. 
Gender cuts across species lines, uniting all 
creatures in a continuous scale of existence. 
This proposition raises for us sane inter­
esting questions: do male humans have llOre 
in CCIl1IlOl1 with male apes than with female 
humans? Is a nursing human llOther llOre simi­
1ar to a nursing wolf llOther than to her 0NIl 
husband? Such questions seem bizarre Only 
because of our long cultural addiction to 
hierarchical scales based ulXXl structural 
criteria. 'lbey are worth reconsidering after 
thirty thousand years of neglect. 
'lbe Paleolithic system of classification 
can be reconstructed only by inference for 
the arts and actions of ancient hunting peo­
ples. Although it may have been systematic 
and comprehensive, it is not articulated in a 
lxrly of literature or law. If nodels of 
dynamic order were to be found only in such 
cultures, we would have to assume that they 
are only appropriate to the circumstance of 
hunting and gathering, and perhaps not ap­
plicable to the refined cultures of civilized 
human life. There is at least one example, 
however, of a systemic cosrrology based upon 
gender symbolism developed by a highly 50­
pusticated culture that is fare fran hunting 
and gathering: Chinese Taoism. 
'lbe Chinese Book of Tao describes a 
structural nodel of the world which was pre­
sent in the cultural traditions of China for 
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many centuries before its articulation by Lao 
Tzu around the fifth century B.C. The con­
cept of life as a "way" (Tao) and the p:>lari­
ties yin and yang were present at the ear­
liest stages of recurded Chinese thought in 
the third rnillenium B.C., [4] and they may 
rest up:>n much older structures, like those 
of Paleolithic art. Whatever its origins, 
Taoism's concepts corresp:>nd in i..rnpJrtant 
ways to the implicit pulosophy of Paleoli­
thic hunting culture, and with other ancient 
concepts of world order which deserve to be 
re-examined in our time, as we search for a 
new eculogical view of the nature of things. 
The world as described by Taoism con­
sists essentially of processes, not of 
things. Objects and organisms are media 
through which process (Tao) becx::Koos manifest, 
just as language is one medium through which 
thought becanes manifest, but neither things 
nor language are equivalent to the processes 
which they partially represent. 
Taoist cosmology offers a model of the 
world based upon modes of action and rela­
tionship which are reciprocal rather than 
hierarchic. status is not significant in 
this system, for all of its essential can­
ponents are of equal importance: 
Tao is great 
Heaven is great 
Earth is great 
And the king [representing mankind] is 
also great. 
There are four great things in the uni­
verse, and the king is one of them. [5] 
The four great canpanents of reality are not 
=rnpetitive but canplementary and imitative 
of one another: 
Man models himself after the Earth,
 
Earth models itself after Heaven,
 
Heaven models itself after Tao.
 
And Tao models itself after Nature. [6]
 
Taoism insists that relationships anong the 
canponents of reality must be mutually can­
plementary. Integrative processes within the 
cyclic system of the universe are essential 
to Taoism, but the relative status of its 
various parts is inconsequential. 
Neither does the evolutionary chronology 
of Taoist thought presuppose a status hierar­
chy based upon priority in time or a destiny 
intended to glorify one canponent of reality 
over others. Instead, Taoism describes mere­
ly a process of increasing canplexity: 
Tao produced the Q1e. 
The Q1e produced the two. 
The two produced the three. 
And the three produced the ten thousand 
things. [7] 
The "ten thousand things" inclooe all the 
fonns and species of the earth, with no spe­
cial status reserved for mankind. The things 
of the earth are not organized according to a 
nature-man-god hierarchy, as in the Western 
chain of being, but according to the balanced 
p:>larity of yin and yang: 
The ten thousand things carry the yin 
and embrace the yang, and through the 
blending of the material force they 
achieve hanoony. [8] 
Harrrony is achieved through blending, rather 
than status being achieved through conquest. 
Taoism is a dynamic ethic, rather than a 
rationale for triumph. 
Yin and yang are female and male prin­
ciples independent of sexual geI¥.l.er. Like 
the symbols in the caves of Paleolithic hun­
ters, yin and yang divide the world's fonns 
into two canplernentary categories according 
to their modes of being and action, without 
regard for their species, status, or sexuali­
ty. Yin is passivity, yang is activity; yin 
is space, and yang is surrounding fonn; yin 
is receptive, and yang is contributive; yin 
is fluid, and yang is its container. In 
Paleolithic symbolism, yin is the wotmd, and 
yang is the spear. In the emerging vocabu­
lary of modern brain research, yin yang are 
names for the right and left hemispheres of 
the human brain. In all, male and female are 
organizing principles applicable to a total 
and integrated model of world reality. Pre­
requisite to such integration is the need to 
view things as they are: 
• the person Should be viewed as a 
person and the world should be viewed as 
the world. [9] 
fbw, then, are things? What are the 
genuine needs of an individual, a family, a 
ccmnunity, and of the world? The answers to 
these questions which are emerging fran the 
ecological and ethological stOOies of the 
past half-century have begun to sound sane­
thing like the statements of Taoist PUla­
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SOPly. Science appears to be a:mfirming the 
implicit PlilosoPlies of Paleolithic art and 
the ways of life camon arrong ancient and 
lOCldern hunting peoples, not to mention the 
patterns which govern the lives of many non­
human animals. None of these deeply-rooted 
traditions guarantees special rights to human 
beings which contradict the rights of other 
species or of the natural envirornnent. 
Rights in such systems are based on 
inherent natural characteristics which re­
quire expression and fulfillment. Since 
these characteristics are subject to change 
according to time curl circumstance, rights 
are necessarily as variable as the contexts 
in which they are exercised. water on a 
slope has a "right" to flow downhill, because 
it is its nature to do so; water in a shel­
tered pool has a right to quiescence, for the 
same reason. Rights are inherent in the 
physics, the chemistry, the Plylogeny, the 
anatany ~ the Plysiology, and the ecology of 
things--in other ItfUrds, in their Tao. 
In groups of natural things, the exer­
cise of individual Tao is often canpetitive 
with curl restrictive of other Tao. water's 
right to rtn1 downhill, for instance, treaI1S 
abridgement of the hill's right to retain its 
contours, for it is eroded in the process. 
Big fish deny the right to life of smaller 
fish. Wind blows according to its stonrry Tao 
curl prohibits water fran remaining placid 
even in sheltered pools. When I1Ullti.ple func­
tions exist, as they always do in ecosystems, 
the rights of individual canponents I1UlSt be 
subordinated to the requirements of the over­
all environment. The rights of integrated 
systems necessarily take priority over the 
rights of individual ccrnponents, not because 
systffilS have higher status, but because their 
conditions of systemic balance are an aggre­
gate of their constituent organisms. 'lll.e Tao 
of systems is collective. 
Temporal order, too, has its own sys­
temic integrity. 'lll.e evolution of species 
I1Ulst take precedence over the growth of indi­
viduals, and the processes of succession in 
ecosystems I1UlSt enjoy the right to proceed, 
even to the abridgement of the rights of any 
participating species. Evolution curl su=es­
sion are not status hierarchies, rot cyclic 
temporal chronologies. Early stages in both 
are essential to the overall process, and the 
fact that they may be "primitive" in fonn 
does not lessen their importance. 'lll.e first 
fireweed to grCM upon newly erupted volcanic 
ash is as essential as the ponderous pine 
which will daninate a climax ecosystem on the 
same site ten centuries later. 'lll.e first 
PlilosoPler is as important as the m:>st re­
cent one. 
Rights in ecosystems are functions of 
the particular successional stage the system 
has reached at any given time--that is, 
rights are variable according to the candi­
tion of the environment. When rabbits are 
abundant, lynx enjoy a right to rapid repro­
duction, which is later withdrawn when the 
rabbit population declines. 'lll.e fireweed's 
right to propagate its kind over new soil 
disappears when botanical su=ession has 
restore a lIDre ccmplex vegetation on the 
site. On a larger time scale, the righ'.:s of 
dinosaurs to evolve as a species was denied 
by the environmental conditions of Pleisto­
cene glaciation. 
tb individual organisms, and probably no 
species, enjoy an inalienable right to live 
when their ways of life are contrary to their 
environmental circumstances. Of the billion 
or lIDre species which have existed at one 
tiJre or other on the earth, only about one 
percent nCM survive. Those that do survive 
earned their durability by adapting to envi­
ronmental change, not because of their supe­
rior status, and not because of their ability 
to rranipulate environments for their own 
welfare. 
The rights of non-human nature are not, 
and never have been, uncertain, except in the 
thoughts of humans. They are canplex and 
variable, but they are finnly established 
upon the foundation of evolutionary history. 
Natural rights are enforced by the biological 
systems governing plant curl animal evolution 
and distriOOtion and by the necessary corres­
pondence between natural rights and their 
environmental contexts. 'lll.e only species to 
suffer genuine confusion about its rights is 
our own. We have lost confidence in our 
instincts and have devised ways to contradict 
and suppress them. We lack sensitivity to 
our environments, and we feel free to IOOdify 
them to conform with our conceptual lOCldels of 
reality. We lack kncMledge of our rights as 
a biological species, and of the responsibi­
lities which accanpany them. 
Human behavior can reasonably be tested 
by asking whether specific acts or patterns 
of behavior occur in non-human species as 
well. Acts which have sane counterpart in 
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other an.im3.ls may be tentatively assumed to 
enjoy a basic validity, possibly based upon a 
cc.mtDI1 evolutionary history shared by humans 
and by other animals which have evolved be­
fore us and with us. Property and ownership, 
for instance, seem to be important to many 
territorial species. Whether humans are a 
territorial species, however, remains in 
doubt. It is fXJSsible that our custans of 
land Cffmership and the social systems built 
upon these custans express ancient and in­
stinctual human patterns, or that they are 
the COIlSe:JUences of an agricultural way of 
life dating back only a few thousand years. 
Territoriality can, perhaps, be understood 
better when we know roore about its importance 
to our near evolutionary neighbors, the other 
primates, and roore about the anthropology of 
our non-agricultural human ancestors. Terri­
torial rights reside in a grey area which has 
not yet been ade:J\}ately explored. 
'!he right to kill other animals for 
food, however, is impossible to deny to any 
carnivorous species. Sane doubt may exist 
that hLlma~s are naturally carnivorous, but, 
the antiquity and universality of human hun­
ting are sufficient to affirm that killing 
animals of another species for food is a 
basic behavioral pattern of hLllllanity, as 
firmly established as the hunting rights of 
bears or other ClIlU'livores. When we kill for 
purposes other than food, however, or when we 
kill members of our Cffm species, then we are 
on shaky ground. Hunting for entertainment 
or recreation is difficult to justify on 
precedents fran other predatory species; the 
killing of conspecifics by marder or warfare 
is even roore rare; and killing for purposes 
of revenge is virtually unknCffm apart fran 
the abundant examples provided by human his­
tory. Only humans can visit the iniquities 
of their fathers unto the sons of the third 
or fourth generation. 
Behavior that is seemingly unique to our 
species, such as revenge killing, re:JUires 
detailed examination to determine whether it 
is rooted in unique conditions attending the 
evolutionary differentiation of humans fran 
other animals, or if it rests upon p..rrely 
intellectual models of realitv which lack any 
biological basis. Clearly, revenge is possi­
ble only for a species capable of l1lE!Il\Jry and 
imagination. It is, therefore, made availa­
ble to us arrvng the special functions of the 
human brain. '!he question, then, is whether 
it is also a necessary and appropriate fea­
ture of our species in the light of evolu­
tionary history and the re:JUirerrents of envi­
rornnental adaptation. Does revenge behavior 
enhance the prospects for our species1 does 
it help to fit us better into the world 
ecosfhere? Or is it, as seens roore likely, 
an abberation of human mentality that serves 
to estrange us fran one another and fran the 
world around us? 
sane forms of human behavior are so 
blatantly out of step with natural patterns 
of existence that no precedent whatsoever can 
be found for them anywhere in natural his­
tory. Volcanoes may add lethal chemicals to 
the atIrosfhere for brief periods, but they 
cannot pretend to destroy as many forms of 
life as the industrial pollution of the past 
two centuries. No other species can systema­
tically destroy the other animal species 
which compete with it or cause it nuisance. 
No other species can extract quantities of 
oil and minerals fran the lithosfhere, or add 
poisons and wastes to it as ours can. And 
none save humans can overpop.liate the entire 
world sufficiently to destroy species diver­
sity and to muddle the integrity of the en­
tire world ecosfhere. Only in the past few 
centuries have humans aaruired these dan­
gerous skills in actual fact, although the 
enabling laws and ideologies fran which they 
have grCffm are, perhaps, three or four thou­
sand years old. 
Humans cannot "bestow" rights upon non­
human nature any roore than men can prescribe 
the rights appropriate to waren. Models of 
the world which as~ a status hierarchy 
aroong =eatures of different kinds do vio­
lence to the rights of all =eatures, even to 
those who have made a place for themselves at 
the top. Yin and yang offer a roore pranising 
concept of world order than top and bottom 
have ever provided. Without sane such fhilo­
sofhy that is consistent with the natural 
history of the world, the rights of humans 
and non-humans alike will remain in jeopardy. 
1he ethics governing our attitooes toward 
nature govern also our relationships with 
other human beings. 
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been featured in magazines, and helped devel-
op courses of study. I have seen people at 
their stupidest and nnst intransigent, yet I 
have also, en many occasions, seen the effi-
cacy of reason and witnessed the tritnnP1 of 
decency over self-interest. In the midst of 
all of this tumult, I have been fortunate, 
indeed, to enjoy the security of a stable 
hare life and have benefitted fran living 
with a wife and son (born in 1979), both of 
whan are considerably brighter than I am. 
(By the time my wife, a matherratician, has 
finished going over my papers and speeches 
and rubbed my nose in every conceptual flaw, 
am IOClrally certain all my bases are covered 
and am prepared to face anyone.) My little 
boy has attended my speeches and lectures so 
often that he has only to hear the word 
"ethical" and he falls instantly aaleep. 
When I gave the C. W. H~ Meirorial Lecture 
at Kings College, London, in fact, he sat 
erect in the first rCM, much to the amazement 
of the audience, apparently absorbed in the 
lecture, and slept quietly fran the first 
sentence on, to be awakened only by the ap-
plause, in which he enthusiastically took 
part. 
For the i.rrrnediate future, I anticipate 
working primarily on the treatment of animals 
in science, not because there aren't other 
areas of pressing concern, but because it is 
the area I knCM best. Then, too, despite 
frequent lapses, scientists are professional-
ly coumitted to abiding by the rule of reason 
and are, thus, amenable to rational and sci-
entific persuasion. Where profits and bottan 
line are, as it were, the bottan line, as in 
animal agriculture or in horse-racing, ra-
tional argument is obviously not the IOClst 
effective force for change. 
In addition to the all-import-...ant IOClral 
dimension, it seems clear to me that the 
issue of animal use in science teaches us 
much about the nature of science. For if, as 
scientists frequently say, contemporary bio-
IT¥3di.cine is essentially dependent on invasive 
use of animals, surely they cannot also claim 
as part of the ideology of science that sci-
ence is value-free, since every such invasive 
use of animals presupposes the m:>ral judgment 
that the benefit gained by science is of 
greater value than or trumps the animal pain 
or suffering. Also, the scientist's ability 
to ignore the camon sense demands of IOClrali-
ty when dealing with laboratory animals is 
itself a fascinating fhenanenon, based in 
part upon a widespread notion integral to the 
ideology of science that one can make no 
judgments about animal feelings and awareness 
and that imputatien of consciousness to ani-
mals is anthropaInqilic and scientifically 
meaningless. This in t.urn leads to bizarre 
Cartesian claims that ani.mcls don't really 
feel pain; they cnly "vocalize" or "ShCM 
aversive behavior. n My nnst recent work is 
designed to confute the orthodox view that 
claims about animal minds are meaningless and 
to ShCM that it was basically an indefensible 
historical accident, inconsistent with funda-
mental biological premises, but pragmatically 
expedient, which led to a denial of mentation 
to animals. In this way, I hope not only to 
change the scientific gestalt on animal con-
sciousness but to shed light on the less than 
rational manner in which scientific change 
takes place. 
As the concept of local and public re-
view of animal research gains credence, peo-
ple will becc:ire increasingly aware, as, in-
deed, they have in the human research area, 
that IOClral deliberations are not bull-sessions 
and do not take place in a vacuum. This, 
hope, will in turn ensure that the tissue of 
questions surrounding these IOClral issues 
about animals will becane the object of se-
rious study and research and, correlatively, 
receives academic respectability and a place 
for study in institutions of higher learning. 
cnly in this way can such issues becane a 
permanent and legitimate area of enIfhasis in 
a democratic society. 
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